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Abstract
Relative deprivation and group consciousness theories differ in their
predictions of how personal discrimination and personal discontent will be
related to taking collective action.  According to relative deprivation theory,
assessments of personal status should be unrelated to taking collective action.
 In contrast, group consciousness theories suggest that while perceiving
personal discrimination is necessary for collective action to occur, feelings of
personal discontent may inhibit it. Female students completed questionnaires
assessing their perceptions of, and affective responses to personal
discrimination, as well as their participation in collective actions.  A
hierarchical regression analysis found that personal discrimination and
discontent interacted such that among women who perceived personal
discrimination, women took the most collective actions when they did not feel
personally discontent with their status.  Implications for the relationship
between negative emotions and intergroup behavior were discussed.
Perceiving and Feeling Personal Discrimination:
Motivation or Inhibition for Collective action?
If you perceive yourself to be personally discriminated against will you take
actions aimed at enhancing the status of the group ?  Traditional psychological
theories of collective action, such as relative deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby,
1976; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984) would suggest not.
 Relative deprivation theory offers one of the most detailed discussions on the
relationship between perceptions of discrimination and collective action.  This
theory refers to personal or “egoistic deprivation” and defines it in terms of
perceiving oneself to be deprived in relation to others.  Perceived personal
deprivation has been considered to be irrelevant to collective action-taking
because actions to enhance a group's status are presumably an unlikely
response to what is perceived to be an individual situation of deprivation.
 Instead, it has been suggested that an individual perceiving personal
discrimination might take individual actions aimed at enhancing their own
status.  Consistent with this hypothesis, perceptions of personal deprivation
have been found to be related to actions that enhance one's individual status
(Hafer & Olson, 1993; Kawakami & Dion, 1993), but unrelated to
participation in collective actions (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Birt & Dion, 1987;
Bowen, Bowen, Gawiser & Masotti, 1968; Geschwender & Geschwender,
1973; Muller, 1973; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Walker & Mann, 1987;
Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).  
The lack of an empirical association between personal deprivation and
collective action however, may be due to the way personal deprivation has
been traditionally defined.  Personal deprivation has been most commonly
defined as occuring in relation to other members of the ingroup; women are
asked if they perceive deprivation in relation to other women (Appelgryn &
Bornman, 1996; Birt & Dion, 1987; Crosby, 1976; Geschwender &
Geschwender, 1973; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972;
Walker & Mann, 1987).   In contrast, when perceptions of perceiving personal
discrimination are defined in relation to the outgroup, perceived personal
discrimination may indeed become important in understanding collective
action.  This would be consistent with the Five Stage model of intergroup
relations (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984), which suggests that group members who
recognize they are personally deprived in relation to the advantaged group
play an important role in consciousness raising and motivating collective
action.   Empirically, it has been found that women were more likely to take
collective action when they perceived both personal (e.g., “I am discriminated
against in relation to men”) and group discrimination (e.g., “Women are
discriminated against in relation to men”) than when they perceived group
discrimination alone (Foster & Matheson, 1995).  Thus, perceiving personal
discrimination in relation to the outgroup appears to play a role in
understanding when minority group members will take collective action.  
This finding is also consistent with alternative theories of intergroup
relations, namely group consciousness theories (Bartky, 1977; Bowles &
Duelli Klein, 1983; Dreifus, 1973; Kimmel, 1989; Lerner, 1986; Stanley &
Wise, 1983).  These theories tend to be based the experiences of activists and
have been more recently developed in the context of new social movement
theories (Cohen, 1985; Friedman & McAdam, 1992; Gamson, 1992).  In
contrast to relative deprivation theory, group consciousness theories suggest
that in order for collective action to occur, minority group members must
recognize their personal experience with discrimination.  These theories
suggest that women’s recognition that they too have personally experienced
gender discrimination, involves an understanding that discrimination against
members of their group is occurring, but as well, that they themselves are
affected by this discrimination.  Discrimination therefore becomes redefined as
“their problem and my problem”.   As such, the group’s status is likely
personally relevant to their own status and collective action may be a more
likely response by individual group members.  While it may seem that
recognizing the group is discriminated against should obviously necessitate
recognizing personal discrimination, especially if the individual identifies with
the group, past research suggests that while disadvantaged group members
recognize their group is discriminated against, they do not necessarily perceive
such discrimination to affect them personally (e.g., Crosby, 1982, 1984;
Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam & Lalonde, 1990).  This distinction between the
group and the individual also occurs when the individual identifies with their
group  (Crosby Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell & Whalen, 1989, Porter & Taylor,
1992).  Perceiving personal discrimination then, appears to be a different
experience from the perception of group discrimination alone, one that group
consciousness theories (e.g., Bartky, 1977) suggest is an integral component in
taking collective action.
In addition to the cognitive perception of discrimination, individuals may
also experience an affective reaction to perceiving discrimination that plays a
role in collective action (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).  For
example, a woman may recognize that she has fewer opportunities, and may
feel very discontented with her status.  Alternatively, she may be happy to
have a job, and therefore feel little discontent with her perceived status.
 Relative deprivation theorists suggest that it those who are highly discontent
with their perceived status who will be more motivated to act than those who
are not discontent (Dubé & Guimond, 1986; Martin, 1986; Tougas & Veilleux,
1988; Runciman, 1966;  Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).
In contrast, some group consciousness theories suggest that high discontent
with personal discrimination may impair behaviors such as collective action
 (Cross, 1971; Downing & Rousch, 1985).  These theories suggest that women
who experience high negative feelings with their disadvantaged status may be
distracted from participating in behaviors to enhance their group’s status.
 Instead, they may be focused on dealing with their emotions and as such, are
not focused on the problem at hand, namely discrimination.  For example, a
woman who experiences pay inequity and is highly discontent with her status
may be focused on coping with her distress, rather than on how to resolve the
problem.   In contrast, a woman who perceives personal discrimination, yet is
not highly discontent with her status is theorized to be able to focus on ways to
resolve the problem of group discrimination with behaviors that would serve
to enhance the status of the group.  The notion that negative emotion is
distracting is consistent with other literatures.   For example, the achievement
motivation literature has found negative emotions such as anxiety to impair
task performance (Brockner & Fulton, 1978; Heckhausen, 1991; Sarason,
1975).  Literature on coping with depression suggests that a focus on emotion
will maintain depression and impair any positive behaviors to alleviate it (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Thus, according to Downing and Rousch (1985),
high discontent may distract women from participating in collective action
while lower levels of discontent with one’s personal status may enable women
to be more focused on participating in  collective action.  
Given the different perspectives, there is a need to evaluate the role of
discontent in motivating collective action.  However, empirical research has
tended to focus on the cognitive perceptions of discrimination rather than
affective reactions (e.g, Abeles, 1976; Appelgryn & Nieuwoudt, 1988; Barnes
& Kaase, 1979; Crawford & Naditch,1970; Crosby et al., 1989; Geschwender
& Geschwender, 1972; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Van Dyk & Nieuwoudt,
1990; Walker & Mann, 1987).  When affect has been considered, it is usually
considered to be another outcome variable in response to cognitive perceptions
of discrimination rather than a predictor of action (Bernstein & Crosby, 1980;
Folger, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, & Rheaume, 1983; Olson, 1986), or in
relation to attitudes rather than behavior (Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996; Birt &
Dion, 1987; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983).  As a predictor of attitudes,
increased negative affect has been found to be a better predictor of stronger
nationalistic (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983), militaristic attitudes (Birt &
Dion, 1987) and protest orientation (De La Rey & Raju, 1996) than cognitive
perceptions of deprivation.  However, the one study did examine collective
action (Martin, Brickman & Murray, 1984) found that feelings of deprivation
(affect) were unrelated to endorsement of collective actions.  This finding may
have resulted because the measures of perceived discrimination combined the
cognitive and affective items into a single index of perceived personal
discrimination.  Therefore,  the relative roles of cognition and affect in
collective action were unclear.
Given the inconclusive research, the present study therefore sought to
examine the relative roles of cognition and affect in taking collective action.  If
relative deprivation theory is supported, then perceiving personal
discrimination and feeling personal discontent should be unrelated to
collective action.  If group consciousness theories are supported, perceiving
personal discrimination, but feeling little personal discontent should be related
to taking greater collective action.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Female students (N=163; Mean age = 23) from Introductory courses at
Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada completed a 30-minute questionnaire
assessing their subjective cognitive perceptions of personal discrimination,
their affective reactions to those perceptions, as well as their participation in
collective actions.  Once the questionnaires were completed, students were
given an oral and written debriefing regarding the purpose of the study.
The present study was interested in examining the role of women’s cognitive
and affective responses to personal discrimination in collective action, given
that they already recognized their group was discriminated against.  Therefore,
participants were then included in the analysis only if they reported perceiving
group discrimination 1 (N = 117).
Materials
Perceptions of personal discrimination (Foster & Matheson, 1995).  Using a
scale that ranged from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (7),  perceptions
of personal discrimination were assessed by having participants indicate the
extent to which they disagreed or agreed with seven statements:   “I have equal
status relative to men of my peer group”, “For the same employment, men will
be paid more than I“, “I have to work harder than men in my peer group to
reach my goals”, “I personally have not suffered from the effects of sexual
discrimination”, “Men have more employment opportunities than I”, “I have
less power than most men", “I am in an inferior social position compared to
men”.   Reverse scored items were recoded such that on all items, high scores
reflected high perceived personal discrimination.   The mean rating across all
seven items was used as the overall personal discrimination score (Cronbach
alpha = .85).       Affective reactions to discrimination/Personal discontent .
  Consistent with past research (e.g., Martin, Brickman & Murray, 1984),
affective reactions were assessed with feelings of content/discontent.   On a
separate page, the personal discrimination items were again presented.
 Participants were asked to re-read each item, keeping in mind how they had
rated their personal status.  They were then asked to rate each item on a scale
of 1 (highly discontent) to 7 (highly content) to indicate how they felt about
their perceived status: discontent or content.  Thus, participants were
providing their affective reactions (in discontent) to their perceptions of
discrimination.  Reverse scored items were recoded such that high scores
reflected high discontent.  The mean rating across the seven items was used as
the overall scale score (Cronbach alpha = .84.)
Collective  action (Foster & Matheson, 1995).   Participants indicated with a
check mark which of a list of 25 actions they had participated in during the last
six months.   Collective action was defined as any behavior directed at
enhancing the group status (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990).  Behaviors
included private actions such as "I have gone out of my way to collect
information on women's issues," as well as public actions such as "I have
participated in protests regarding women's issues",  all aimed at enhancing the
status of the group.  The list of actions was derived from Lalonde and
Cameron (1993) but were reworded to maintain context specificity for women.
 The total number of actions engaged in during the last six months was used as
the overall score.   Scores could range from 0 to 25.
Results
Descriptive Statistics .   Descriptive statistics were examined to assess the
degree to which participants reported perceiving personal discrimination,
feeling discontent about their perceived status, and participating in collective
actions.  Participants scored significantly higher than the midpoint on personal
discrimination, indicating that they perceived personal discrimination ( M =
4.9, SD = 1.1, t(117) = 9.24, p < .001, η 2 = .65 ).  Participants scored
significantly below the midpoint on personal discontent, indicating they did
not feel personally discontent, ( M =2.4, SD = 1.3, t(116) = -13.36, p < .001, η
2 =.77).  In addition, participants reported feeling a lower intensity of
discontent relative to the magnitude of discrimination they perceived, t (116) =
13.67, p < .0001, η 2 = .62.
Consistent with past research (e.g., Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990),
participants took relatively few collective actions ( M = 7.32, SD = 4.4, Range
= 22).  Among the most frequently endorsed actions were private actions such
as “I have gone out of my way to collect information on women’s issues”
(73.5%), “I make a conscious attempt to use non-sexists language (69.2%).
 Private actions that required slightly greater risk or publicity were also highly
endorsed, for instance, “I have discussed women’s issues with family or
friends, stressing the need to enhance women’s position in society” (76. 1%),
“If, in a group of strangers (i.e., people who I haven’t know for long, or well),
a sexist comment is made, I will make a point of arguing against it” (59%).
  The most public actions showed less endorsement: “I am a member of an
organization that deals with women’s issues (17.9%), “I have participated in
protests regarding women’s issues” (17.1%).
Hierarchical regression analysis
In order to examine the relative associations between personal
discrimination, discontent and collective action, a hierarchical regression
analysis was conducted.  Collective action was regressed onto personal
discrimination and discontent on the first step, and the interaction between
personal discrimination and discontent (the product term) on the second step.
 In order to ensure that the interaction effect would not be a function of
differences in variability, the main effects were standardized, and the product
term was calculated by multiplying the standardized personal discrimination
and discontent scores.  
The main effects explained 19.8% of the variability in collective action, F
(2,115) = 14.19, p < .001.  Standardized beta weights indicated that personal
discrimination, β = .26, p < .01 as well as personal discontent, β = -.28, p < .01
uniquely explained variability in collective action, such that the more women
perceived personal discrimination and the less they felt personal discontent,
the more they participated in collective action.
The main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect which
predicted an additional 5.8% of the variability in collective action, F (1,115) =
12.23, p < .001.  Examination of the final step beta weights (see Table 1)
indicated that the main effect for perceived personal discrimination was no
longer significant, suggesting that the variability explained by personal
discrimination became subsumed under the variability explained by the
interaction (β = .38, p < .01).  
To examine the nature of the interaction, median splits were performed on
both the raw personal discrimination and discontent simple main effects were
analyzed (see Figure 1).  The source of the interaction appeared to be from the
differential relationship between personal discontent and low, high personal
discrimination.  Specifically, women reporting high personal discrimination
participated in more collective actions when they felt low personal discontent (
M = 8.39) than when they felt high personal discontent ( M = 4.71, t (113) =
-3.23, p < .01).  However, women reporting low personal discrimination did
not differ in their participation in collective action as a function of their low (
M = 7.33) or high personal discontent ( M = 5.79, t(113) = -.992, ns.
Discussion
The present study examined how perceiving personal discrimination and
feeling personal discontent would be related to taking collective actions to
enhance group status.  It was hypothesized that if relative deprivation theory
were supported, results would show a lack of association of perceiving
personal discrimination and discontent with taking collective action.  If group
consciousness theories were supported, results would show that perceiving
personal discrimination would be related to greater collective action, and
personal discontent would be related to less collective action.     Consistent
with group consciousness theories (e.g., Bartky, 1977; Dreifus, 1973), these
relationships were supported.  
However, these main effects were qualified by an significant interaction
between perceiving personal discrimination and feeling personal discontent on
collective action.   In particular, among women who perceived little personal
discrimination, feelings of personal discontent were not differentially related
to women’s participation in collective action.   This is not surprising in that it
might be expected that despite perceiving group discrimination, when people
do not perceive the problem to be personally relevant (personal
discrimination), the strength of their feelings of personal discontent will not
likely make a difference in whether they take action.
In contrast, personal discontent was related to participation in collective
action among women who perceived high personal discrimination.
 Specifically, those who felt low personal discontent took more collective
actions than those who felt high personal discontent.  Thus, perceiving high
personal discrimination and feeling highly discontent regarding one’s status
appears to play an inhibitory role for taking collective action.  This
interpretation would be consistent with Downing and Rousch (1985) who
suggest that negative emotion distracts women from the task at hand, namely
taking collective action.   
However, the presence of negative emotions is not necessarily equivalent to
a focus on negative emotions.  Women may indeed be discontent, but not
necessarily be focused on their discontent.  Thus, distraction may not explain
why collective action decreased for women who perceived personal
discrimination and felt personal discontent.  It may be that discontent appeared
inhibitory because it may encompass emotions that serve to inhibit behaviors
to resolve a negative situation, namely anxiety and helplessness.  Consistent
with learned helplessness theories (e.g., Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale,
1978), it may be that if discontent involves feelings of anxiety and
helplessness, that women who feel personal discontent regarding their
perceived personal discrimination, may feel overwhelmed, unable to effect
change, and therefore be less likely to participate in collective action.  The
notion that discontent encompasses some level of anxiety and helplessness is
consistent with other operational definitions of discontent.  For example, when
exploring the affective component of relative deprivation, researchers have
operationally defined it as participants’ ratings of their feelings of
dissatisfaction and  resentment (discontent), combined with feelings of
anxiety, helplessness (De La Rey & Raju, 1996) and depression (Appelgryn &
Bornman, 1996).  If discontent does involve more intense negative emotions
such as anxiety and helplessness, then it may indeed serve to inhibit
participation in collective action.  
The notion that negative emotional reactions to perceived personal
discrimination involve anxiety is also consistent with Crosby’s (1984) denial
hypothesis.  Crosby (1984) suggests that the notion of personal disadvantage is
so anxiety provoking that minority group members prefer deny that it occurs.
 For example, in the present study,  while women on average perceived
personal discrimination, they did not feel discontent about it.  Thus it appeared
as if women were expressing the opinion that “I’m discriminated against, but
I’m not upset about it”.  Consistent with Crosby (1984), this may suggest that
women are “denying” their negative emotional reactions to their perceived
personal discrimination because of the associated anxiety.  
Indeed, the specific meaning of discontent as it was assessed in the present
study is ambiguous, and as such it cannot be assumed that discontent involved
feelings of anxiety.  Given the lack of empirical research on the relationship
between discontent and collective action, the purpose of the present study was
to examine the role of a generalized sense of discontent.  To do this, the
definition of discontent was left open to women’s subjective interpretations,
rather than limiting their reporting of their negative emotional reactions to a
particular feeling.  As the present study showed, women’s feelings of
discontent, however women were defining it, appeared to be inhibitory.  Thus,
the next step in the research must be to clarify how women are defining their
discontent in order to better understand its role in taking collective action.  
While the data was consistent with the hypothesis that increased discontent
may inhibit collective action, the correlational nature of the data cannot
preclude the possibility of a recursive relationship.  It is also possible that
instead of personal discontent inhibiting collective action, collective action
may inhibit personal discontent.  Participation in action may help women to
feel in control of their disadvantaged status in that they are acting to effect
change.  As such, their discontent regarding their status may decrease.
 Experimental studies will therefore be necessary to clarify the direction of
relationships between personal discontent and collective action.
In summary, the present study found that women who perceived high
personal discrimination participated in greater collective action when they felt
low discontent than when they were highly discontent.  In addition to
supporting the various psychological theories that suggest negative emotion is
inhibitory (Downing & Rousch, 1985; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Sarason,
1975), this finding also appears to reflect North American ideology.  Indeed,
North America’s “rugged individualism” ideology trains individuals to believe
that they can conquer any problem if they remain “tough” and ignore emotions
that make us “weak”.  In other words, we restrict our emotions we will be able
to resolve our problems, but if we let ourselves “feel too much”, we will
unable to help ourselves.    
However, suggesting to minority group members that they lower their
personal discontent may not be an appropriate solution for political apathy.
 First, to suggest that minority group members “get over” their discontent in
order to enhance collective action may serve to delegitimize their feelings
regarding discrimination.  Indeed, given the pervasiveness of discrimination,
negative emotional reactions may not be something that victims of
discrimination can simply reduce.   It may be however, that if negative
emotions are defined differently, they may become motivational.  For
example, the present study only examined general perceptions and reactions to
discrimination (e.g., I have less power than most men).  If women were
responding to a general sense of discrimination, they may be defining
discrimination on a more pervasive, or global level.  Consistent with learned
helplessness theories (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), global
attributions are associated with feelings that individuals will be ineffective or
helpless to alter their situation.   Once the individual feels helpless to alter a
situation, they will exhibit passivity, rather than acting to resolve the situation.
 As such, negative emotions regarding global discrimination may indeed be
associated with reduced motivation to participate in collective action.  In
contrast, if discrimination were measured in relation to a specific situation
(e.g., harassment at work), having to take action to resolve this one specific
situation may be less overwhelming.  Indeed, the thought of being able to
change one situation is less overwhelming than having to change many
situations. As such, negative emotions regarding a specific instance of
discrimination may be more motivational.    Indeed, while as the present study
suggests, general feelings of personal discontent may inhibit collective action,
future research may discover possible ways in which personal discontent may
ultimately become motivational.
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    Footnotes
1 Group discrimination was measured using the group-level counterparts of
the personal discrimination items: “Women have equal status with men”; “For
the same employment, men will be paid more than women”; “Women have to
work harder than men to reach their goals”; Women do not suffer from the
effects of sexual discrimination”; Men have more employment opportunities
than women”; “Women have less power than men”; “Women are in an inferior
social position compared to men”.  Participants rated these items using a scale
ranging from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (7).  Reverse scored items
were recoded such that on all items, high scores reflected high perceived
personal discrimination.  The mean rating across all seven items was used as
the overall group discrimination score (Cronbach alpha = .89).  Participants
were selected if they scored above the midpoint.
Table 1
Regression of collective action onto main effects, interaction
r        β        R 2 unique    R 2 total
Personal discrimination    .36**              -.04
Personal discontent              -.38**              -.52**                .198**
Interaction             .20**        .38**        .058*        .256**
Note :    Beta refers to the final step beta weights
** p < .01
Figure Caption
Figure 1.   The interaction between personal discrimination and personal
discontent on collective action.
